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Abstract 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is an effort by nine states to constrain carbon 
dioxide emissions from the electric power sector using a cap-and-trade program. This paper 
assesses the importance of long-term electricity contracts under the program. We find that 12.2% 
of generation will be accounted for by long-term contracts in 2010, affecting select nuclear, 
hydroelectric, and cogeneration units. The contracts will have a negligible effect on the wholesale 
marginal cost of electricity and a small effect on retail price. States may want to consider 
contracts on a case-by-case basis when making decisions about the initial distribution of emission 
allowances, but they should account for effects on the portfolio of plants owned at the firm level, 
not the effects on individual facilities. Because of their relatively small effect, it seems 
unnecessary to allow the existence of long-term contracts to dictate the design of the overall 
program. 
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 The Effect of Long-Term Generation Contracts on Valuation 
of Electricity Generating Assets under the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
Nathan Wilson, Karen Palmer and Dallas Burtraw
∗ 
1. Introduction 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is an effort by nine northeastern 
and Mid-Atlantic states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
1 The program initially will 
constrain carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the electric power sector using a 
mandatory cap-and-trade program. An investigation and deliberative process involving 
staff and stakeholders from the participating states is expected to culminate in 2005 in a 
memorandum of understanding and model rule that would be implemented by the states’ 
governors beginning later this decade. Ultimately, the program could be expanded to 
address other sources of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. If successful, it could become a 
model for a more comprehensive, national cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases.  
The implementation of RGGI could affect profoundly the market value of 
electricity generation assets in the region and in neighboring regions. For instance, a coal-
fired power plant with a relatively high CO2 emission rate could face substantial new 
costs relative to other facilities. Consequently, it may experience a reduction in utilization 
that would affect its market value negatively. If generation prices are set competitively, 
as they are in most RGGI states, then the market price of electricity will rise to the extent 
that emitting sources determine marginal generation cost and the retail electricity price. 
This price increase partially will counterbalance the higher costs faced by coal plants. 
However, nonemitting and low-emitting electricity generators, including nuclear units 
and many types of renewables as well as relatively efficient natural gas units, will 
experience little increase in cost but will be able to capture increased revenues. 
Nonemitting and low-emitting sources can also expect higher utilization given their lower 
costs. These changes could lead to significant increases in their market values.  
One of the most important factors that affect the value of individual facilities is 
the method through which CO2 emission allowances are allocated initially. Burtraw, 
Palmer, and Kahn (2005) examine three basic methods of initially distributing emission 
allowances: based on historic measures, updating measures of performance, or through an 
auction. The authors show that the way that allowances are distributed significantly 
affects the increase in electricity price and the ability of generators to pass on costs to 
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consumers, which ultimately determines the effect of the program on the asset values of 
generators.  
The study by Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn is built on a model of efficient 
electricity markets to determine wholesale electricity prices. In practice, however, 
electricity markets may not behave as characterized in the study. One primary reason is 
the existence of long-term contracts between electricity generators and distribution 
companies that may prohibit electricity prices from adjusting to accommodate the cost of 
compliance with the RGGI policy as predicted by the model. In that case, the predictions 
in the study about changes in electricity prices and the effect on consumers and producers 
of a greenhouse gas policy will be incorrect. If long-term contracts constrain the change 
in wholesale electricity prices, then the price effect of the policy will be less than forecast 
in the study. While this result is relevant to the industry in general, it is especially 
important to those individual facilities affected by these contracts, especially those that 
also face an increase in costs because of their emissions of CO2. In some cases, owners of 
facilities may face an unexpected increase in costs due to the RGGI policy and they may 
not be able to offset that cost through an increase in electricity price. 
This paper assesses the importance of long-term contracts to the determination of 
electricity price and to the calculation of the change in the market value of electricity 
generation assets as reported in Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn. We provide information 
based on a survey of all the states involved in the RGGI process. Given the limited 
resources available for this inquiry and the proprietary nature of some contracts, we do 
not provide a comprehensive accounting of contracts. Instead, we develop an upper-
bound estimate of the amount of electricity generation that is under long-term contract 
based on interviews with state public utility commission (PUC) staff as well as other 
interested parties in each state. We characterize this generation by the type of generation 
technology and fuel. On this basis, we assess the importance of long-term contracts to the 
forecasts provided in the previous study. 
The next section of this paper outlines the way that long-term contracts can affect 
electricity price and the change in revenue that will be received by individual facilities. 
Subsequently, we provide the results of our survey organized into six categories of 
potential contracts: special nuclear arrangements; public hydropower; non-utility 
contracts made according to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA); 
contracts for generation that resulted from the restructuring of the electricity sector; 
tolling contracts; and miscellaneous types of contracts. We conclude with an assessment 
of the role of long-term contracts and how policymakers should consider the long-term 
contract issue when deciding which allocation scheme to pursue.  
In brief, we find that long-term contracts for electricity generation are not 
widespread in the RGGI region. The results of our survey suggest that for the entire 
region no more than 13.8% of total generation in 2003 will still be under fixed price 
contract in 2010 and probably somewhat less. Three quarters of this generation is in New 
York State. If there is an increase in total generation from 2003 to 2010, the percentage 
will shrink accordingly. For example, if electricity demand increases 13.4%, as suggested 
by growth rates estimated in the Annual Energy Outlook 2005, then only 12.2% of total 
generation will be accounted for by long-term contracts (Energy Information 
Administration 2005).    6
We find that long-term contracts will have a negligible effect or no effect at all on 
the wholesale marginal cost of electricity. Most customers face a retail electricity price 
that is a weighted average of power purchased at the wholesale marginal cost and power 
purchased at contract prices. Hence, the increase in the retail electricity price is likely to 
be slightly less (roughly 13% less) than what is forecast by recent studies (Burtraw, 
Palmer, and Kahn, 2005, and other modeling for the RGGI staff working group). 
Accordingly, the increase in revenue going to the industry as a result of higher prices, 
which serves to partially offset the increase in costs, is overestimated because generation 
facilities under long-term contract will not benefit from the increase in the wholesale 
marginal cost due to the RGGI policy. The vast majority of the facilities under long-term 
contracts are select nuclear units, hydroelectric units, and cogeneration units operating 
under PURPA contracts. Because of their relatively small effect, it seems unnecessary to 
allow the existence of long-term contracts to dictate the design of the overall allocation 
scheme. Since these contracts may have significant effects on the individual plants 
involved, however, states may want to consider their status on a case-by-case basis when 
making decisions about the initial distribution of emission allowances. Some generation 
facilities will gain value and some will lose value under the RGGI policy. It is the 
portfolio of plants owned at the firm level that should be considered in making 
adjustments to allocation for the purpose of compensation.  
2. Long-term Contracts Affect Electricity Price and Asset Value 
As stated above, in a competitive electricity market the implementation of a cap 
on CO2 emissions could lead to higher wholesale electricity prices as generators pass 
through the costs of constraining their emissions. Long-term contracts that force 
individual generators to forego this higher price and continue to provide power at the pre-
RGGI price level could have a significant effect on the market value of these generation 
assets.  
To illustrate the effect of a long-term contract on electricity price, consider the 
determination of electricity price in regions of the country with market-based prices, 
which characterizes the RGGI region. Except for those few, mostly industrial customers 
who have time-of-day or real time prices, electricity price is a weighted average of the 
real time marginal cost. Let us denote the real time marginal cost ($/MWh) in time block 
t by Ct and let gt represent generation (MWh) in this time block. Denote total generation 
over time period T={t} as GT. Then in the absence of fixed price contracts, the electricity 
price for the average customer for period T will be the average of marginal costs 






G ∑ . This is the representation of the 
competitive electricity price in competitive regions in the Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn 
study if one ignores further distinctions in the model between generation price, reserve 
price, capacity payments, transmission and distribution costs, and customers facing real 
time prices. 
If a share (s) of generation is delivered under fixed price contracts at marginal 
cost C 
f there can be two effects on electricity price. One concerns the determination of   7
the real time electricity price and the other concerns the electricity price faced by retail 
customers, which is an average of the real time electricity price and the contract price. 
The determination of the real time electricity price is affected if the generation 
under fixed price contract would be the technology determining marginal cost in the 
absence of the contract. We find that this is seldom the case. Most of the generation under 
fixed price contract includes nuclear, hydroelectric, and renewables, which are not the 
marginal technology in most time blocks. Natural gas generation usually is the marginal 
technology and is rarely under long-term contract, with the exception of natural gas fired 
non-utility cogeneration facilities. In 2003, these facilities accounted for 34% of all 
natural gas generation, 63% of non-utility generation providing power to the electricity 
grid, that is, excluding industrial and commercial cogeneration, and about 9% of total 
generation. By 2010, when the program may take effect, we estimate that only about 20% 
of the generation under these contracts in 2003 will be under the original contract. The 
remainder of these contracts will have expired and/or have been renegotiated in light of 
the RGGI program. Moreover, cogeneration facilities often operate under other 
technological or contractual constraints that reduce their flexibility and the likelihood that 
they would ever determine the marginal cost of electricity generation in the market. 
The second effect of fixed price contracts results because retail electricity price 
will be an average of that portion of power purchased at the competitive electricity price 
and that portion purchased at the fixed price. Where the implementation of RGGI raises 
the marginal cost of generation while some portion of wholesale electricity is purchased 
at a fixed price, those generators under a fixed price contract lose potential new revenue 
while their customers or other various stakeholders downstream gain as a consequence. 
Who is the winner among downstream stakeholders will depend on the specific rate plans 
in place for distributors. For example, if a distribution company’s retail rates are still 
partially cost-based while wholesale costs increase, then retail consumers benefit from 
the presence of the long-term contract because the distribution company’s costs do not 
increase. On the other hand, in some cases a distribution company obtains power from a 
generator under a fixed price contract but only a portion (x) of its sales to retail customers 
are at a fixed price and the utility charges the remaining portion (1-x) of its downstream 
retail customers the competitive electricity price, which is not affected by the fixed price 
contract.
2 Including this possibility, the average retail electricity price (P) for all 
customers is: 





Ps x C s x C
G
=+ − ∑  
                                                 
2 Despite the restructuring of electricity markets in all RGGI states, most of the electricity sold by 
distribution companies is sold under a fixed price arrangement, and thus in most RGGI states x is very close 
to 1 for residential customers. Using the percentage of load that is served by alternative providers as a 
proxy for (1-x) (Rose 2004) suggests that only New York has a substantial amount of switching to 
alternative providers among residential customers (roughly 5% of total residential load). Looking at all 
customers taken together, the share of total load served by alternative suppliers ranges between 38% 
(Maine) and 2% (Connecticut).     8
  The difference between the retail price and the weighted average marginal cost 
may be negative or positive, depending on the terms of the fixed price contract, that is, 
whether C 
f is greater than or less than the weighted average marginal cost term. 
However, if the effect of a RGGI policy is to raise costs for at least some generators, then 










⎝⎠ ∑ . Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn account for the change in 
generation cost and in generation in each time block due to the increase in the electricity 
price and its effect on demand, but they do not account for the contribution of fixed price 
contracts. The actual change in electricity price due to the RGGI policy is likely to be 
smaller than Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn forecast by approximately s x. One of the 
purposes of this paper is to assess the potential magnitude of the overestimate of the 
change in electricity price in that study. 
  Another important finding in Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn is the effect on the 
market value of generation assets as a result of the RGGI policy. The authors use a 
discounted cash flow model to calculate market value as the net present value of future 
revenues minus future costs for the equilibrium solution. The most important source of 
future revenues in the model is the real time marginal cost of power (including the 
payment for reserve capacity). If the presence of fixed price contracts has virtually no 
effect on the real time marginal cost, as suggested above, then the main effect is that the 
change in aggregate revenues for the industry under the policy is based on the change in 









⎝⎠ ∑ . The change in 
revenues for individual facilities also will differ; those facilities under contract will 
receive the contract price rather than the market price, and hence they will receive no 
increase in revenue. For these facilities, the authors’ findings about the change in the 
value of generation assets will be overly optimistic. The second purpose of this paper is 
to assess the extent of this difference. 
  Finally, a central factor that determines whether long-term contracts deserve 
special consideration is timing. Many contracts may expire before the RGGI policy takes 
effect or before the policy ramps down the emission cap to a level that imposes important 
changes in the costs for the industry. These contracts do not seem to be important to the 
questions we are interested in. Second, contracts between privately owned facilities and 
distribution utility companies reflect expectations about future events. If these contracts 
were signed under the shadow of a potential carbon policy, then to some degree the 
negotiated price reflects the expected change in market conditions. To some degree, the 
fixed price contracts may already be adjusted to account for the change in costs of the 
RGGI program.  
3. Survey Findings 
  We surveyed state officials to obtain a characterization of fixed price contracts 
and an indication of their effect on the change in electricity price and on the change in the 
value of generation assets. To the extent that it is possible, we identify the share of   9
generation under contract in the aggregate and for specific technologies and the degree to 
which retail contracts reflect the fixed price wholesale contracts. We analyzed six types 
of contracts that we believed to be relevant. 
3.1 Nuclear Contracts 
The buyers and sellers of some nuclear facilities signed long-term contracts 
during the competitive restructuring process. These were designed to serve two purposes. 
First, the contracts guaranteed distribution utilities—the plants’ former owners—a large 
amount of the base-load capacity and generation they required. Second, the new owners 
of the nuclear facilities were assured of a buyer for their power, ensuring that they would 
be able to achieve a return on their investment. Our survey of different state utility 
commissions suggests that contracts of long enough duration to still be in effect during 
the RGGI cap-and-trade program are not common; there appear to be only three in the 
RGGI region. Each contract is unique; even contracts signed for power from different 
reactors at the same facility are not analogous.  
  For example, at the Nine-Mile Point nuclear power plant in New York, the first 
reactor’s power is contracted through 2009, when its operating license expires. The 
second reactor (9M2) has a 20-year contract that began in 2001. The generator receives a 
fixed price during the first 10 years of the deal, and a revenue sharing approach is taken 
for the second half of the contract. During this period, the price of power is allowed to 
fluctuate if it is within a given band. If the cost exceeds the upper bound, then the 
difference is split 80/20 between the purchaser and the generator. If price falls below the 
price floor in any month, then 80% of the difference is accounted for and credited against 
any potential future payments for months where prices exceed the upper bound. If there 
are negative balances at the end of the term, the investor-owned utility does not pay them 
to the generator—they are just ignored (money can flow only from the generator to the 
utilities purchasing power). The contract with 9M2 accounts for 90% of total output; the 
remaining 10% is not constrained by the contract and is sold at market price.  
The R. E. Ginna nuclear facility in Rochester, NY, has a deal that is similar to the 
first 10 years of the 9M2 contract. Finalized in June 2004, the contract obliges the plant’s 
buyer to provide 90% of the facilities’ generation to Rochester Gas & Electric at a fixed 
price. The Vermont Yankee plant is the only other nuclear facility with a long-term 
contract in the RGGI region. Unlike the two New York facilities, it signed a 10-year 
contract promising 100% of its output to its former owner when it was sold in July 2002. 
Depending on market conditions, the price it received would fluctuate within a pre-
established band.  
None of the other nuclear plants in the region, including those in New York, has a 
contract longer than five years and none extend beyond 2004.
3 The PUC officials of other 
states in the RGGI region (and major observers) assert that the remainder of nuclear 
plants bid into the independent system operators-operated day-ahead markets like any 
                                                 
3 Based on personal conversations and Nuclear Energy Institute (2005).    10
other base-load generators. This is true even in New Jersey, where nuclear power 
accounts for more than 50% of total generation. 
Table 1 provides a list of all nuclear units in RGGI and an indication of its 
contract status or the date that the contract expires. The final two columns indicate the 
capacity of each nuclear unit and the general contract terms, including the amount of 
generation that is expected to be under contract in 2010, the year we assume RGGI will 
take effect.  
Having gained an understanding of how much nuclear generation will remain 
under long-term contract after RGGI takes affect, we consider who benefits: the 
distribution companies that purchased the power or the consumers that ultimately will use 
it. As stated above, the answer to this question is dependent on the nature of the rate 
agreement negotiated by the local PUC and the distribution company. At present, rate 
arrangements in both New York and Vermont suggest that the bulk of the benefits accrue 
to consumers. In the notation introduced in the previous section, x = 1. 
In New York, only 25% or so of most utilities’ consumers chose rate plans other 
than the fixed, cost-of-service option. Since the rate plans that consumers’ chose elapse in 
2005, it is possible that competitive options will have a much larger share by the time 
RGGI is implemented. However, there have been no indications of broad consumer 
unhappiness and no suggestion that distributors will be able to stop offering a cost-based 
option. Therefore, we believe it more reasonable to assume that consumers will reap the 
benefits of the long-term nuclear contracts in New York.  
Moreover, at present the New York Public Service Commission has structured 
electricity rates so that even those consumers who eventually choose to purchase their 
electricity from a competitive supplier would benefit from the existence of fixed price 
contracts. Broadly, the process works as follows. Consumers receive a credit for the 
difference between the market rate of generation and the long-term fixed price from their 
initial distribution utility. This credit is often referred to as a hedge. Though it nets out to 
the same effect, the credit is kept separate from the price (generally set at the average 
cost) of the commodity they are purchasing. If a given ratepayer switches to a 
competitive power supplier, they no longer have to pay the average cost of electricity 
provision, instead paying whatever the competitive supplier is charging. But the ratepayer 
retains the credit (some call this “taking the hedge with you when you go”). 
At the present time, there is even more limited access to competitive power 
providers in Vermont. Large industrial or commercial plants were given the right to 
contract with suppliers in 2004, but the Public Service Board has not moved away from 
its 2001 statement that the state’s wholesale power markets were not sufficiently 
developed to allow retail competition for at least a few years (American Public Power 
Association 2005). 
In conclusion, we find that the vast majority of power from nuclear plants will not 
be under fixed price contracts during the period that RGGI will be in effect, beginning 
approximately in 2010. Where there are fixed price contracts for power from nuclear 
plants in effect, we find that the vast majority of benefits would accrue to the ratepayer.  
   11





(MW) Contract  Details 
Pilgrim MA  7/13/99  670  5-year  contract at 3.5 to 4 cents/kWh 
Oyster Creek  NJ  8/8/00  619  3-year contract at 3.4 cents/kWh 
Vermont Yankee  VT  7/1/02  510 
10-year contract at 3.9 to 4.5 cents/kWh 
with "low market adjuster" 
Indian Point 3   NY  11/21/00 965  3.6 cents/kWh through 2004 
Fitzpatrick NY  11/21/00 778 
3.2 cents/kWh for 46% of output and 
declining to 31% in 2004; 500,000 KW 
at 2.9 cent/kWh (balance of output) 
Nine Mile 1  NY  11/7/01  613 
Fixed price (dependent upon year) 
contract for 90% of output from date of 
sale through the end of license in 
August 2009 
Nine Mile 2  NY  11/7/01  937 
10-year fixed price contract, followed by 
10-year revenue sharing agreement; 
90% of output 





Indian Point 2  NY  9/6/01  975  3.9 cents/kWh through 2004 
Seabrook NH  11/1/02  1161  Unknown 
Ginna  NY  6/10/04  495  90% of output sold for 10 years 
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute 2005; discussions with PUC officials.  
 3.2 Public Power 
New York is the only state in the RGGI region with long-term contracts for 
publicly owned hydroelectric power. The New York Power Authority (NYPA) operates 
two major facilities: the Niagara Falls and St. Lawrence River projects. In accordance 
with federal law, the plants provide very low cost power to municipal and rural electric 
cooperatives. The NYPA also sells some of its power at cost to government agencies, 
private companies, and private utilities for resale.
4 The principal reason that New York is 
the only state with long-term hydroelectric contracts is that there are no other large 
                                                 
4 Information on NYPA can be found at its website: http://www.nypa.gov/about/whoweare.htm.    12
publicly owned dams in the Northeast. Most of the dams in the region were built prior to 
the 1940s. Table 2 contains a description of NYPA’s two public hydroelectric facilities. 
At present there is no indication that the current arrangement of selling public 
hydropower at or close to cost will change prior to 2010 or at any point thereafter. In 
other words, it is likely that NYPA will not receive the higher wholesale electricity prices 
expected to prevail after RGGI’s enactment. The Niagara Falls and St. Lawrence River 
projects are publicly owned and exist to benefit consumers. As the current contracts were 
established to help consumers, the fact that consumers will benefit from them even more 
under RGGI does not pose a redistributive problem. Retail customers are likely to receive 
the overwhelming majority of the benefits since as we noted in 3.1, most of them 
continue to receive cost-of-service rate plans.  
 
Table 2. Public Hydroelectric Contracts in RGGI 
 
State  Capacity 









Power Project  NY 912  100%  Perpetuity 6,129,198  6,129,198 
Niagara Falls  NY  2625.9  100%  Perpetuity 12,066,078 12,066,078
Source: New York Power Authority, http://www.nypa.gov/facilities/default.htm; EIA, 906 and 920 
historical databases, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia906_920.html.  
3.3 PURPA Contracts 
By far the most common form of long-term generation contract is with non-utility 
generators (NUGs). These contracts date largely from the 1980s under the rationale that 
allowing entrepreneurs to supply power to utilities could increase the efficiency of the 
generation sector, coupled with growing concern about the environmental consequences 
of traditional generation technologies. PURPA facilitated contracts with NUGs. Under 
PURPA, utilities were obliged to purchase power from qualifying facilities (QF) at a 
price equal to the cost they “avoided” having to pay to develop new facilities themselves. 
The QFs were mostly small combined heat and power (cogeneration or “co-gen”) 
facilities or non-hydroelectric renewable plants (Borenstein and Bushnell 2000).  
In retrospect, it is clear that many of the PURPA contracts were signed during a 
period of high electricity prices. By the late 1990s, the fixed prices paid for NUG power 
consistently were above current market prices. Because the contracts have proven 
uneconomic in this way, utilities in the RGGI region have been working with PUCs to 
buy their way out of the contracts. Where this has proven impossible, the utilities were 
able to incorporate the contracts into their stranded cost recovery process during 
restructuring. While the PURPA contracts are a widespread phenomenon, they vary 
widely in nature. Most are small in scale, but others, like the Panda Brandywine and   13
Warrior Run plants in Maryland (a state that has observer status in the RGGI process), 
are 180-megawatt projects.  
Maine probably has both the most PURPA contracts and generation (relative to 
overall consumption) inside the RGGI region. At one time, the state had as many as 80 
contracts with NUGs, a substantial proportion of which remain in effect. It should be 
noted, however, that the capacity of most of the plants is very small, perhaps even too 
small to be subject to RGGI caps. However, even if the plants have no compliance 
obligation, the asset values of these plants could be affected by changes in electricity 
price if they are not operating under fixed price contracts. Public utility commission 
officials from both Pennsylvania (another RGGI observer) and Massachusetts also 
acknowledge that their states still have a fair number of contracts with NUGs in force. 
Most of these in Massachusetts are due to expire in 2012, while those in Pennsylvania 
will remain a factor through 2020. Long-term contracts for the aforementioned projects in 
Maryland were signed in the late 1990s; the contract for Warrior Run’s power will not 
expire until 2029. 
It is difficult to determine an exact estimate of the amount of power still covered 
by long-term PURPA contracts. The existing contracts were catalogued during the 
industry restructuring process at the beginning of the decade, but since that time many 
have been paid down without attracting much attention, and hence they are difficult to 
itemize. One can approximate an upper bound for the amount of generation accounted for 
under PURPA contracts using available data.
5 Our estimate of an upper bound is reported 
in Table 3 for each of the states within the RGGI region. The first component is the 
combined heat and power generation devoted to the electric power sector (as opposed to 
powering specific commercial or industrial plants) (column 1), and the second component 
is the non-hydroelectric renewable generation (column 2) that was operating in 2003. The 
sum of these components (column 3) is a generous upper bound because not all of this 
generation remains under contract. 
                                                 
5 We use the Energy Information Administration’s historical data for these calculations. The data can be 
found at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/generation_state.xls.    14












CT  1,985,668 1,565,942 3,551,610 
DE  109,420 0 109,420 
ME  1,691,119 1,134,889 2,826,008 
MA  5,378,236 2,026,483 7,404,719 
NH  0 854,067  854,067 
NJ  12,777,285 1,265,262 14,042,547 
NY  15,614,581 1,751,570 17,366,151 
RI  9,295 101,768  111,063 
VT  0 405,136  405,136 
TOTAL  37,565,604 9,105,117 46,670,721 
 
The second step is to assess how much of the total power potentially under 
PURPA contract in 2003 will remain under contract when RGGI would take effect. We 
estimate this to be 20% of our estimate of initial PURPA generation. We feel this is a 
cautious estimate, meaning that it is an upper bound of the amount of NUG power under 
long-term contract. This estimate reflects several insights gleaned from our conversations 
with PUC officials. First, most of the existing PURPA contracts will have elapsed by 
2010 or soon thereafter, having been signed in the 1980s for periods of 20 to 25 years. 
Second, as noted above, many of the contracts were terminated early because they were 
not economical.  
Hence, we conclude that these culling processes are likely to leave no more than 
20% of our estimate of potential PURPA power in 2003 under long-term contract in 
2010, and they do not account for a significant proportion of total generation. Even in 
Maine, we project that by 2010, long-term PURPA contracts will account for no more 
than 5.2% of the power generated in the state in 2003. Estimates of the amount of 
generation that will be affected are displayed in Table 4. 
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 as Share of 2003 
Total Generation 
CT  3,551,610 710,322  2.43% 
DE  109,420 21,884  0.32% 
ME  2,826,008 565,202  4.23% 
MA  7,404,719 1,480,944  3.12% 
NH  854,067 170,813  0.80% 
NJ  14,042,547 2,808,509  5.02% 
NY  17,366,151 3,473,230  2.57% 
RI  111,063 22,213  0.40% 
VT  405,136 81,027  1.35% 
TOTAL  46,670,721 9,334,144  2.91% 
 
Interestingly, officials in several state PUCs noted that despite the failure of 
PURPA contracts to provide cost savings as predicted relative to other forms of 
electricity generation, there remains political support for using long-term contracts to 
spur the growth of renewable generation. In fact, PUC officials in Massachusetts, Maine, 
Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania all mentioned that such a strategy remains under 
consideration in their respective states. If these or other states decide to increase the role 
of renewable generation by using PURPA-style contracts, it would raise the share of 
generation accounted for by long-term contracts. However, new contracts should be 
negotiated on the basis of expectations that account for the RGGI process. 
Having analyzed how much PURPA generation will remain under long-term 
contract after RGGI takes affect, we turn to the issue of who benefits. As noted in section 
3.1, the answer reflects the nature of the negotiations between the local PUC and the 
distribution companies. In the absence of compelling information to the contrary, we 
believe that it is likely that the entirety of the RGGI region mirrors New York and 
Vermont. Therefore, we judge that the benefits of the long-term PURPA contracts will 
accrue to consumers rather than to distribution companies.    16
3.4 Restructuring 
In another effort to increase efficiency, many states, including most of those in the 
RGGI region, chose to liberalize their electricity sectors during the late 1990s and early 
2000s. One of the most important aspects of this process was the compulsory separation 
or divestiture of generation assets from formerly vertically integrated utilities. The 
rationale for this policy was the fear that in its absence utilities would be unduly 
prejudiced against purchasing non-affiliated generation. This would undercut the desired 
improvements in efficiency and result in unnecessarily high prices to consumers. 
Divestiture came about in a number of different ways. Some plants were sold off to 
wholly independent firms, while others were transferred to unregulated affiliate 
companies. Still other plants remained under the control of their utility owners but were 
subject to new regulatory oversight. While all types of plants were divested, fossil fuel 
plants were especially likely to be separated from the operational control of the 
distribution utilities. Divestiture was common throughout the RGGI region, though some 
states appear to have experienced higher rates of divestiture than others. For instance, 
Bushnell and Wolfram (2005) found that all of the fossil fuel plants in Connecticut that 
they examined were divested as of 2003, whereas only 69 percent of those plants in New 
York were.  
During conversations with various state PUC officials, we found further evidence 
of differences in the extent and manner in which control over generation was separated 
from the rest of a distribution utility. For example, in Maryland and Rhode Island, the 
formerly integrated utilities were compelled to disconnect themselves from their 
generating assets either by placing them in a legally distinct affiliate or by selling them to 
third parties. Not even voltage support units were allowed to remain under the direct 
operational control of the distribution utilities.  
By contrast, in New Jersey and New York, the restructuring statutes themselves 
said very little about separation. Nevertheless, the majority of utilities’ generation assets 
were placed into affiliates in New Jersey and sold off in New York. (New York utilities 
did keep some generation assets. For example, the New York State Electric and Gas 
Corporation retained ownership of a number of small hydroelectric facilities.) Though not 
compulsory, these actions did receive the approval of state PUCs.  
In Massachusetts, legislation provided strong incentives for the sale or legal 
separation of non-nuclear facilities from distribution utilities, though it did permit utilities 
to pursue intra-firm structural separation. The incentives (which were related to the 
amount of stranded costs that could be recovered) proved sufficiently large that all of the 
generation assets were sold to fully independent third parties. None were placed in legally 
distinct affiliates. Other states like Maine pursued a broad policy of separation but 
allowed utilities some leeway in case it became clear that retaining some generating units 
for reliability purposes was efficient.  
The restructuring process, and especially the divestiture of generation assets, 
produced several types of fixed price generation contracts. First, divestiture led to 
bilateral contracts between the buyers and sellers of the generation assets. Just like the 
nuclear contracts discussed above (themselves a special form of divestiture contract), the 
deals between fossil fuel plants and their former owners helped both parties to manage   17
their risks. Often, these divestiture contracts were used by utilities to lock in generation 
for the new “standard offer service” (SOS) rates they offered to consumers.  
These rates were the successor to the standard, cost-of-service rates that 
consumers had received prior to restructuring. Temporary and generally set at a fraction 
of the last cost-of-service rate, the SOS arrangements were designed to give the public 
time to prepare for and learn about competitive pricing. Our survey produced no evidence 
that any RGGI region divestiture or SOS contracts were signed for longer than five years 
or extended beyond 2004.  
When the transition period for SOS rates ended, most consumers shifted to 
“default service” rates, which are sometimes referred to as “provider of last resort” rates. 
These are the rate options that consumers receive if they choose not to select one of the 
competitive options. The power provided under the default rate typically is procured 
through competitive auctions in which generators bid to supply a given amount of power 
for a given price. Our survey of different state PUCs overwhelmingly suggests that the 
contracts for default load are only for between one and three years. This means that 
generators will have plenty of time to factor in the effects of RGGI when making any 
future contracts.  
3.5 Tolling Contracts 
Tolling contracts are different from traditional long-term contracts in which the 
owner and operator of a given facility commits to providing a certain amount of 
electricity in exchange for a given amount of money. Under a tolling contract, the owner 
and builder of the physical plant is removed from its day-to-day operations, having sold 
the right to the output of the plant to another party, generally the plant’s fuel supplier. By 
doing so, the builder is able to lock in a return on the capital investment. The operating 
partner controls the extent to which power is produced and sold. In this sense, unless the 
operating partner enters into a long-term supply contract of its own, the effect of the 
RGGI program on the financial status of the operating partner is the same as facilities 
operating without contracts in the electricity market. 
3.6 Other 
We also explored whether long-term contracts might exist for other reasons. For 
example, due to the physics of electricity transmission and lack of transmission capacity, 
plants in some regions need to run in order to maintain network reliability. These plants 
have reliability-must-run contracts with the transmission grid operator, but our survey 
found that they typically are not more than a year or two in duration.  
  We also explored whether some states may have used long-term contracts to 
further economic development. For example, a plant in an economically depressed region 
could receive a long-term, must-run contract to ensure the creation of jobs. The desire to 
spur job creation in the western part of Maryland influenced the decision to award the 
Warrior Run PURPA contract. While political considerations definitely effect contract 
considerations, our survey did not produce any evidence that such de facto subsidies have 
a direct influence on generation contracts that is distinct from previous categories.    18
4. Conclusion 
We are motivated to examine the role of fixed price contracts because of their 
potential effect on two important measures. One is the degree to which these contracts 
mitigate the change in electricity price due to a RGGI policy. Using the notation 
introduced in Section 2, the contracts lower average electricity price by a factor s x, 
which equals the share of generation under fixed price contract multiplied by the portion 
of sales to retail customers that pass through power purchased at the fixed price. The 
second effect is that the revenues to facilities under contract will be the contract price 
rather than the market price. Hence, these facilities will not benefit from the increase in 
market price due to the policy and potentially they may claim special compensation due 
to their inability to recover changes in costs through changes in electricity price.  
Two factors affect whether facilities under long-term contract deserve special 
consideration. One factor is whether the contracts expire before the RGGI program takes 
effect or at least before emission reductions are substantial enough to have an important 
effect on an individual facility. Since the RGGI program is likely to implement a 
schedule that starts with small emission reductions in the first years, the program will not 
affect the cash flow of affected facilities until well after the program is implemented. 
Many of the long-term contracts that are in place today will no longer be in effect by 
2010, and hence the facilities will not be constrained by the existing contracts.  
The second factor is whether the contract was signed in a time period when 
parties reasonably could and should have anticipated climate policy affecting the 
electricity sector. Climate has been recognized as a major environmental issue since 
President George H. W. Bush signed and the U.S. Senate ratified the 1992 Rio de Janeiro 
Climate Convention. Leaders of all parts of industry were made aware of the potentially 
binding emission reductions that might be required when parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The 
RGGI process itself began in 2003 when New York Governor George E. Pataki sent 
letters to the 11 governors from Maine to Maryland inviting their states’ participation. 
The exact date at which contracting parties should be deemed to have fiduciary 
responsibility for anticipation of climate policy is debatable, but beyond this date there is 
little economic rationale for adjustments for contracts negotiated under the shadow of 
climate policy. At some point in time, parties should have been able to incorporate the 
possibility of regulatory change into their negotiations.  
To assess the role of fixed price contracts, we conducted an informal survey of 
staff at PUCs and/or other informed individuals in each of the nine northeastern states 
participating in RGGI plus the observer states of Maryland and Pennsylvania. The results 
are organized according to six types of potential fixed price contracts. We find that three 
types of contracts are in evidence, and the magnitude of generation under each type of 
contract is summarized in Table 5. The first column of data in the table reports total 
generation by state in 2003. The next three columns report generation under fixed price 
contract for nuclear facilities, hydropower, and non-hydro renewable facilities operating 
under PURPA contract. The latter is an upper bound estimate. The fifth data column 
sums the potentially affected generation in 2003, and the sixth column adjusts this 
number to account for the amount of this generation that is expected to remain under the   19
current contracts in 2010. The final column expresses the generation in 2010 as a 
percentage of total generation in 2003.  
Our analysis suggests that if regional demand for electricity remained constant at 
2003 levels, then no more than 13.8% of generation will still be under fixed price 
contract in 2010.
6 If there is an increase in total generation from 2003 to 2010, the 
percentage will shrink accordingly. For example, if electricity demand increases 13.4%, 
as suggested by growth rates derived from the Energy Information Administration’s 
Annual Energy Outlook 2005, then only 12.2% of total generation will be accounted for 
by long-term contracts (Energy Information Administration 2005).
7 Table 5 also shows 
that the effect of long-term contracts is not equally distributed either among states or by 
fuel type. Of particular interest is the fact that three quarters of affected generation is in 
New York State, where more than half of affected generation is accounted for by two 
public power facilities.  
Table 5 provides a basis for calculating the change in electricity price due to 
RGGI. The change in electricity price under RGGI is a weighted average of the change in 
the real time marginal cost and the generation under contract. We assess that all the 
savings are passed on to customers or in terms of the notation in section 2, that x = 1. We 
assess that the value of s is something less than 0.138. Therefore, we conclude that it is 
possible that the change in electricity price calculated in Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn 
overestimates the true effect on retail customers by up to 13.8%.
8 Since we arrive at this 
estimate using cautious upper bound values, the overestimate is probably somewhat less 
than this. 
The second question we address is how fixed price contracts affect the change in 
asset values. For a specific facility, this depends on whether that facility is under fixed 
price contract and, if not, on the change in revenues. As noted, on average the change in 
revenues in Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn is overestimated by up to 13.8%. Knowledge 
about contracts affecting specific facilities is beyond the reach of this paper, but we can 
provide average estimates by categories of generators for the industry. These estimates 
are presented in Table 6. Contracts affecting nuclear and hydroelectric facilities are 
assigned directly to these technology categories. These facilities do not emit CO2 and 
therefore will not face an increase in cost associated with the RGGI policy. The other 
                                                 
6 Note that in recent modeling by Burtraw et al. (2005) the average electricity price in RGGI is a composite 
of prices set in the three constituent North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) regions (New 
England, New York, and Mid-Atlantic Area [MACC]), which are forecasted to differ by $20/MWh 
between New England/New York and MAAC in 2020. Thus, when trying to adjust the price effects from 
RGGI and different allowance allocation approaches for the presence of long-term contracts, one could 
disaggregate this 13.8% to find the percentage within each constituent NERC region. Given that most of 
the affected generation is in New York, there is likely to be some variability in the adjustment across the 
different regions.  
7 This crude growth estimate is based on the total growth in electricity demand of the three NERC regions 
that include RGGI states. The estimate is inexact because New Jersey and Delaware cannot be 
disaggregated from the remainder of the MAAC. 
8 This estimate is based on the assumption that the response in electricity demand to the 13.8% difference 
in the change in the retail price is too small to cause a change in the mix of generation technology.   20
types of contract that may be important are those related to PURPA, which can use a 
variety of fuel types. The vast bulk of the generation associated with this category comes 
from four prime movers: coal, petroleum, natural gas, and non-hydroelectric renewables.
9 
Table 6 indicates that a large portion of nuclear and hydroelectric generation may be 
affected but that a much smaller portion of other types of generation are affected.  
To illustrate how this information can be applied directly to the aggregate 
numbers in Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn, let us consider the New York State example. The 
previous study calculates the change in the value of generation assets as the change in the 
present discounted value of revenues and costs. The existence of long-term contracts is 
not expected to have any important effect on the costs faced by different units. 
Disregarding the change in generation from these facilities, only the change in revenues 
needs to be considered in adjusting the predicted change in asset values.  
Table 6 reports that about 30% of nuclear generation in 2003 will remain under 
long-term contract in 2010. Therefore, the actual change in revenue for each unit of 
electricity generated by nuclear plants ($/MWh) is only about 70% of that estimated in 
the previous study. Because nuclear units face no increase in costs, the change (an 
increase) in the asset value of the nuclear units in New York is likely to be only 70% of 
what was reported previously. Since we identify the nuclear units specifically, the change 
can be attributed directly to the firms owning those units. Similarly the owner of the 
affected hydroelectric units is known. However, the owners of the affected PURPA units 
listed in Table 6 are not known and in the absence of additional information that might be 
provided by firms, to adjust the predicted change in revenues, one could apply the 
percentages to all generation of that fuel type before recalculating the expected change in 
asset values.  
In summary, the results of our survey suggest that long-term contracts for 
electricity generation are not widespread in the RGGI region. States may want to consider 
their status on a case-by-case basis when making decisions about the initial distribution 
of emission allowances, but this should be done in the context of the effect of the RGGI 
policy on the portfolio of generation assets owned by a firm. Depending on the nature of 
the contracts, it may make sense to make adjustments to allowance allocations in 
different ways. However, it seems unnecessary to allow the existence of this group of 
contracts to dictate the design of the overall allocation scheme. 
 
                                                 
9 A fractional amount of generation is associated with “Other Gases” or “Other” fuel sources.    21
Table 5. Summary of Affected Generation (MWh) 
 
 























in 2010 as Share 
of 2003 
Generation 
CT  29,211,997  -  -  3,551,610    3,551,610      710,322   2.43% 
DE  6,793,275  -  -  109,420     109,420       21,884   0.32% 
ME  13,360,664  -  -  2,826,008    2,826,008      565,202   4.23% 
MA  47,535,574  -  -  7,404,719    7,404,719     1,480,944   3.12% 
NH  21,245,461  -  -  854,067     854,067      170,813   0.80% 
NJ  55,915,704  -  -  14,042,547   14,042,547     2,808,509   5.02% 
NY  135,172,639  12,292,665  18,195,276  17,366,151   47,854,092    33,961,171   25.12% 
RI  5,578,298  -  -  111,063     111,063       22,213   0.40% 
VT  6,021,886  4,444,152  -  405,136    4,849,288     4,525,179   75.15% 
TOTAL  320,835,498 16,736,817  18,195,276  46,670,721   81,602,814    44,266,237   13.80% 
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Table 6. Projected Affected Generation as Share of 2003 Generation 





Total Affected  
Petroleum 







CT  0.0% 0.0% 7.5% 0.1% 1.6% 0.0% 2.4% 
DE  - -  0.5%  0.0%  0.2% - 0.3% 
ME  - 0.0%  20.0%  0.0%  2.0% 7.5% 4.2% 
MA  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 4.8% 0.0% 3.1% 
NH  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 
NJ  0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 4.0% 13.7% 1.9%  5.0% 
NY  30.2% 75.2%  1.1%  0.2% 10.1% 3.9% 25.1% 
RI  - 0.0% - 6.4%  0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
VT  100.0% 0.0%  -  0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  75.1% 
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